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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
BOUNDAIS-PROPERTY CONVzYED-HALF OV "LOT"--STREsT.-Plaintiff

and

defendants own, respectively, the easterly and westerly halves of "lot 17"
of a certain tract of land. Defendants' deed described the land conveyed to
them as the "westerly one-half of lot 17" of said tract, according to a recorded map, which indicated that the western boundary of lot 17 is the center
line of an avenue 6o feet wide. Plaintiff sues to quiet title to a strip of land
i5 feet wide adjacent to the center line of said lot. Held, that the 3o-foot
strip covered by the avenue was not part of the lot within the meaning of
the deed, and that therfore the eastern boundary of defendants' land was a
line halfway between the eastern boundary of the avenue and the eastern
boundary of lot x. Earl v. Dutour et at. (Cal., i919), 183 Pac. 438.
A basic rule of the law of real property is that with regard to grants of
land abutting on a highway the ownership is presumed to extend to the middle of the way if the grantor owns that far, unless a contrary intenu'i. appear from the conveyance. Paul v. Carver, 26 Pa. St. 223; Low v. Tibbetts,
72 Me. 92. And at least one court has gone so far as to hold that nothing
short of an intention expressed in ipsis verbis to exclude the soil of the highway can exclude it. Salter v. Jonas, 39 N. J. Law 469; Simmons v. City of
Paterson, 84 N. J. Equity 23 (land contiguous to a river). At least the
declaration to rebut the legal presumption must be clear. Oxton v. Groves,
68 Me. 372. Likewise, if the description is by courses and distances and a
line runs, )n fact, upon, by, or along a street, altnough not so described, the
language will be construed as cdrrying the grant to the middle of such street.
Champlin v. Pendleton, 13 Conn. 23; Sizer v. Devereux, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) i6o.
But in order to have the middle of the highway included, it must actually be
used as a public way, and not merely exist as a designation on a plan. Bangor
House Proprietary v. Brown, 33 Me. 309. Contra, Jarstadt v. Morgan, 48
Wis. 245. Judged in the light of these general principles the instant case is
sound, it simply presenting a different angle to the problem. The conclusion
of the Court, that the term "lot" means "that Jiortion of the platted territory
measured and set apart for individual and private use and occupancy," is
good sense as well as good law.
CONTRACTS-RIGHTS op THIRD PARTY BgNzFirCARY-Husband and wife
entered into a contract whereby the husband agreed to make a transfer of
certain property for the benefit of an invalid daughter. Held, (two justices
dissenting) that under 3 Mich. Comp. Laws 1915, § 12361, which provides
among other things that "in all equitable actions all persons having an interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded, may
join as plaintiffs" the daughter could maintain an equitable proceeding against
the father to enforce the contract, although she was not a party thereto.
Preston v. Preston (Mich., 1919), 2o5 Mich. 646.
The case is the more remarkable in view of the 'fact that the Michigan
Supreme Court, contrary to the prevailing American doctrine, seems hereto-
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fore to have adhered strictly to the orthodox English view that a beneficiary
under a contract to which he is not a party has no enfor.ble interest either legal
or equitable. Knights of the Modern Maccabees v. Sharp (ipo), 163 Mich. 449;
187 Mich. 361; In Re Bush's Estate (1917),
Ediuards v. Thornan (i915),
as the basis
199 Mich. 192. The statute relied upon by the majority opinion
part of the
a
as
legislature
the
by
enacted
first
while
rule,
the
for changing
"Judicature Act of 1915," does not seem to announce a new principle either
of substantive or adjective law. It is simply a statement of the generally
Prevailing equity rule in regard to joinder of parties, and was apparently
borrowed from the Federal Equity Rules (No. 37) and from the state Codes
of Civil Procedure, of which it is an integral part. PoMERoY's COMe RZMEDIEs
(4th ed.) § III. "It is," in the language of the dissenting opinion in the principal case, "a novel idea that a statute, plainly intended to affect procedure
only, may be used to change a settled rule of the law of contracts, to confer
upon a person a legal right and interest in subject matter where there was
none before the statute was enacted". Especially is this so where the statute
is merely declaratory. It is to be hoped that a more satisfactory basis can
be found for a result which is undeniably desirable. For a collection of the
cases and full discussion of the problem involved see I5 HARVARD L. Rrv.

,67;

27

YALE L. Joup- ioo8.

DAMAOGS: MoUsX IN CocA-CoL.-A bottling company sold a bottle containing a m6use as well as the well-known beverage to a retailer, who sold it
(or them) to the innocent and unsuspecting female plaintiff. The lady became acutely sick after drinking the concoction and brought suit against the
bottling company. Held, award of $5oo.oo damages was not excessive, there
being no evidence "that passion or prejudice operated upon the members of
the jury." Bellingrath v. Anderson (Ala., i919), 82 So. 22.
For an exhaustive as well as an interesting discussion of the principles involved in numerous cases of this character, see 17 Micn. LAw Rav. 26L
DzmDS-CNDITIONs-RrPUCNANCY

TO INTEREST CREATZE--S Ax

To NEGRoEs.

-Plaintiff company, owne of many lots in certain locality, sold one lot to
K, under whom defendant, a negro, claims title. The deed to K, duly. recorded, provided that if grantee, her heirs or assigns, should .lease or sell to
any ndgro, Chinese, or Japanese, title should revert to grantor. This was put
in the form of a covenant and expressly stated to run with the land,-to be
terminable, if desired by owner, in 1925. Held: Such condition in deed of
fee simple is within rule of common law, as re-declared in Civil Code of California, § 711, that "conditions restraining alienation, when repugnant to the
interest created, are void." Title Guarantee and Trust Co. v. Garrot, Dist.
Ct. App., 2nd Dist. Cal., 183 Pac. 470.
The. deed in full does not appear in the report of this case, nor was it set
forth in the complaint, the court assuming from briefs of counsel that a title

in fee simple absolute was conveyed thereby, and proceeding on that basis.
The plaintiff's contention was this clause in the deed created a condition subsequent and that, by its violation, the fee was forfeited and the plaintiff is en-
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titled to re-entry. The court agrees th?. this is to be considered as a condition subsequent, but declares it void. '1'e theory, in part, is as follows: that
the granting of a fee simple is a conveyance of the whole estate, and carries
with it an absolutely unfettered right of alienation; and the court thinks,
on principle, that there should be no such restriction allowed either as to persons or time,-(following a dictum in Murray v. Greer 6" -l. 367, in which
case the restriction was not limited either as to persons o. time), and that
the same reasoning which declares void a restraint total as to persons, though
limited as to time, (Latimer v. Waddell, iig N. C. 370), should apply here
with equal force; that any restraint on alienation is repugnant to the grant
of a fee simple. The consideration of public policy, as involved in the uncertainty of titles which the court seemed to fear would follow if such restraints were allowed, seemed to haige some weight in influencing the-decision.
Contra: In the following case it was held that a restriction in deed against
selling to any negro is not an unlawful restraint on powers of, alienation and
not against public policy. Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573; also substantially the same in Queenstorough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, L. R. A.
1916 B, 1201. Professor GRAY, in his RESTaRAINTS Or THE ALIENATION OF
PROPERTY, discusses this subject after an exhaustive review of the casespp. 25-42. He states in part, § 41, as follows: "The authorities, it will be
seen, are in hopeless conflict. The rule which naturally suggests itself is that
a condition is good if it allows of alienation to all the world with the exception of selected individuals or classes; but is bad if it allows of alienation
only to selected individuals or classes. (Williams on Settlements, 134, 135.)
Perhaps this rule might be difficult of application, or easily evaded. At any
rate the leading case of Doe v. Pearon, 6 East. 172, and the late case of
In re Macleay, L. R. 20 Eq. 186, cannot be brought within it, for they both
allow the power of alienation to be restrained within the narrowest limits;
and Sir George Jessel says: 'The test is whether the condition takes away
the whole power of alienation substantially.' L. R. 20 Eq. i8g."

DivoRc-ALrMONY-FUTURa EARNINGS AS PROPERTY UNDER STATUTe,-In
a proceeding for divorce under the Ohio statute (General Code Sec. z1,990)
providing that "the court shall * * * allow such alimony out of her husband's
property as it deems reasonable, etc." it was contended that permanent alimony could not be allowed which was based upon the future personal earnings or wages of the husband. Held, that the words "out of her husband's
property" were directory only and not mandatory and that permanent alimony
could be based on future earning power under this particular statute. Laie
v. Lape (Ohio, i919), 124 N. F_ 51.
The generally accepted doctririe in this country has been that future earnings could be considered as a basis for permanent alimony. Campbell v.
Campbell, 37 Wis. 2o6; Muir v. Muir, 133 Ky. 125; Griffin v. Griffin, 173 Ky.
636; Snyder v. Snyder, 162 N. Y. Supp. 607. And this even though the statute provided for such alimony out of the husband's estate at the time of the
divorce. In the Wisconsin case above cited, the court remarked: "We cannot regard it [the statute] as a hard provision, but as a remedial and bene-
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ficial statute for the protection of natural claim, founded on natural relations." So, too, in the principal case, the court, although not citing in their
opinion the decisions abovb mentioned, or Cox v. Cox, 2o Ohio St. 439, the
latter a decision allowing alimony based upon property acquired subsequent
to the divorce decree, gave a broad interpretation to the words of the statute
upon the grounds of interpreting the intention of the General Assembly. The
instant case in he lower court, Hamilton Insolvency Court, Lape v. Lape,
62 Ohio Law Bulletin 398, was developed on a different and contrary theory
to the one given by the Supreme Court. Dazis v. Davis, 21 Ohio Circuits
136; DeWitt v. DeWitt, 67 Ohio St. 34o. There are early cases which lay
down the proposition flatly that "alimony being an allowance out of the husband's estate for the support of the wife, when there is no estate, there can be
no alimony." Feigley v. Feiglcy, 7 Md. Reports 537, 563. This is based on
the theory that the duty to support stops with the decree of divorce. However the cases following the weight of authority, previously cited, refuse to
follow this doctrine and go on the theory that the duty to support still continues. But in Wilson v. Wilson, 67 Minn. 444, where the statute provided
for permanent alimony "from the estate of her husband", they interpreted the
statute literally and held that future personal earnings could not be the basis
for permanent alimony under that statute, and that the remedy lay with the
legislature, the court admitting the equity of allowing permanent alimony based
on future income, but also admitting their inability to correct it. State of
Minnesota ex rel. Wise v. Jamison, 69 Minn. 427 sustained the above cited
Minnesota case. To the same effect see also Jackson v. Burns, i6 La. 695.
EMINENT DOMAIN-PARTIEs-INCHoAT DOWER-RGHT To DAMAOs.-Action by plaintiff against her husband for a share, as the fair and reasonable
value of her inchoate right of dower, in damages awarded the husband in appropriation proceedings against land owned by him in fee. Plaintiff claims
her right of action under statutes relating to the appropriation of land. Held
-The wife's inchoate right of dower was not such an "interest, legal or equitable, in the property," as would require her to be a party to condemnation
proceedings under the statute. Nor can she claim a present pecuniary interest in the damages awarded, for this fund is no different from any other
personal estate of the husband. Long v. Long (Ohio, gig), 124 N. E. 161.
The reasoning of the court appears sound. If the wife could share in
the fund today, and the husband die tomorrow, she would again share in the
remaining fund, as in all his other personal and real property. Cf. accord,
Weaver v. Gregg, 6 Oh. St. 547; Moore v. Mayor, etc. of City of New York,
8 N. Y. xio; Gwynne v. City of Cincinnati, 3 Ohio 24; Flynn v. Flynn, 171
Mass. 312; contra, Wheeler v. Kirtland, 27 N. J. Eq. 534; In re New York
and Brooklyn Bridge, 75 Hun 558. The Weaver case held that a partition
sale divests the wife of a co-tenant in fee of her inchoate right of dower therein. The principal case is carefully distinguished from those in which creditors
have subjected the husband's estate to the satisfaction of judgments rendered
against him, in which the inchoate right of dower was ascertained and exempted from execution. In such cases the husband's interest has been wholly
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and he receives no compensation such as arises from cases of
extinguis.
eminent domain or a sale in partition. The inchoate right of dower is treated
as some sort of present interest, entitled to protection in equity, in Brown v.
Brown, 82 N. J. Eq. 40 (against a possible bona fide purchaser without notice
from trustee), and in Brown v. Brown, 94 S. Car. 492 (against waste).
FIsH-MUssEL--PRiEr TY or STA.-In a suit by the owner of the bed
of a non-navigable stream for the conversion of mussel shells taken from
the bed of said stream by defendants, the plaintiff claimed the mussels were
part of the realty. Held,--A mussel, having powers of locomotion, is a fish
ferae naturne within the meaning of the Rev. Stat. Mo. igog, Sec. 65o8, and
the owner of the bed of the stream cannot acquire title to them, title being
always in the state. Gratz v. McKee et al, (C. C. A., 8th Circ.) 258 Fed. 335.
Thus mussels in fresh waters seem to be included by an extension of the
law relative to salt water shell-fish, which rules that shell-fish, such as oysters
and clams, in their natural state, are classified as ferae naturae, and their
ownership is in the state in iti sovereign capacity, State v. Harub, 95 Ala. 176,
-though where planted in a place where they would not naturally grow, and
their location well marked, they partake of the nature of ferae domitae, and
are the subjects of private ownership, State v. Taylor, 27 N. J. L. 117, 72 Am.
Dec. 347: People v. Morrison, 194 N. Y. I75. In England, mussels in a mussel bed granted by an order of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, sufficiently known and marked out as such, are the absolute property of the
grantees of the order. Sea Fisheries Act, x868, 31-32 Vict., c 45, ss 51, 52, 53.
Likewise in this country some states may convey or lease beds for cultivating
shell-fish to individuals, and the grantee or lessee gets an exclusive right to
cultivate shell-fish on the bed, protected by equity, Sequim Bay Canning Co.
v. Bugge, 49 Wash. 127. But while power of locomotion, which is mentioned
in the principal case, may bring mussels within the class of swimming fish,
which are ferae naturae, still it would seem more logical that viewed as an
article of commerce, due to the similarity of its organism, habits, and mode
of capture to those of other shell-fish subjects of commerce, the law relative
to property rights in mussels should follow the trend of decisions declaring
property rights in shell-fish, such as oysters and clams. Thus upon principle
the law applicable to mussels in planted beds should be the same as that which
is applied to oysters and clams in planted beds.
three
BREACH OF CONFIDFNC - RESCISSIOx. -The
JOINT ADVENTURERSplaintiffs and the defendant MacDonald purchased an undivided four-fifths
in defendant Oxnam's mine. Later, plaintiffs discovered that defendant MacDonald had agreed secretly with Oxnam that if the project was not profitable at the end of two years, MacDonald should have the right to reconvey
his undivided one-fifth to Oxnam. Hcld, that MacDonald's conduct amounted
to a constructive fraud to which Oxnam ivas a party and that the plaintiffs
had a right to rescind.-Menefee et al. v. Oxnatn et at. (Cal., I919), 183
Pac. 379.
The rule is universal that no one having duties of a fiduciary character
shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which he has, or can have, a
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personal interest, conflicting, or which possibly may conflict, with the interest of those whom he is bound to protect. Glover v. Ames, (C. C.) 8 Fed.
351. Accordingly, it is held that the fiduciary relationship between cotenants
of land is such that it is not consistent with good faith for either of them to
purchase an outstanding adverse title. Van Home v. Fonda, 5 Johns. CI.
(N. Y.) 388. (For criticism of this doctrine see 9 HARv. LAw Rzv. 427.)
The same doctrine has also been extended to the case of a remainderman
purchasing a tax title thereby attempting to exclude the other remainderman.
Held that this was a breach of faith and not allowable. Johns v. John.s,
93 Ala. 239. The law will not permit an agent to place himself in a situation
in which he might be even tempted by his own private interests to disregard
the interests of his principal. People ex rel. Pluger et al. v. Toumship
Board, ii Mich. 222; MxcnEm, AG NcY, Sec. 455. Nor will a partner be allowed to gain a secret advantage or enter into any transaction in any way
adverse to the partnership interests. Nelson v. Matsch, 38 Utah 122, Ann.
Cas. 1912 D, 1242. Therefore, it seems very natural for courts to apply a
similar line of reasoning to cases of joint adventures, even though the essentials of a cotenancy, agency, or partnership are not present. The tendency
of modern decisions is to regard the rights of joint adventurers, inter se, as
controlled practically by the law of partnerships. 15 RULING CAsx LAW 500.
The court in the principal case said that it is immaterial whether the plaintiffs
and MacDonald were partners in the strict sense. Persons engaged in a
joint adventure, or about to assume such a relation, owe to each other the
utmost good faith and will not be permitted to enjoy any unfair advantage.
Where any abuse of that relation is discovered the complaining party is entitled to relief, whether any actual damage be proved or not. "The question
is not whether the breach of confidence has resulted in profit to the unfaithful coadventurer, or whether it has resulted in injury to his joint adventurers,
but whether there has been a breach of confidence on the part of the fiduciary." The mere making of a secret agreement by one of the joint adventurers is such a breach of faith as amounts to constructive fraud and will entitle the coadventurers either to rescind the contract (Noble v. Fox, 35 Okla.
7o) or to maintain an action for damages for fraud and deceit (Page v. Parker, 43 N. H. 363) or to have the defendant account to his coadventurers
(Kennah v. Huston, 15 Wash. 275).
EvicnoN-VzZiN.-At the expira.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-CoNSTRUCTIV
tion of a period of two years of an apartment lease the premises became
infested by cockroaches, which, after notice, the landlord unsuccessfully attempted to eradicate, whereupon defendants moved out. In an action for
rent, held, defendants had not been exonerated from liability. Hopkins v.
Murphy (Mass., 1919), 124 N. E. 252.
The case turns on whether or not the presence of the vermin constituted
an act of constructive eviction. Crosby, J., in disposing of this contention
says "There is nothing to indicate the plaintiff was responsible for the presence of the insects or that he failed in any duty which he owed to the defendant." In this he touched the real issue. The cases almost without dis-
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sent take the view that the act complained of must be one of. omission or
commission by the lessor. TirrANY on LANDLORD AND TENANT. P. 1258-62.
Inability to link the cause with the lessor is fatal, though the actual condition of the premises renders its inhabitance impracticable. Lack v. Wyckoif,
xi N. Y. St. Rep. 678; Griffit v. Freeborn, x8 Mo. App. 203. An early case
in point arose in New York in 1887 in which it was held that a constructiye
eviction could not be predicated on abandonment by reason of the presence
of vermin. Pomeroy v. Tyler, 9 N. Y. St. Rep. 514. England, on similar
facts is in accord. Hart v. Windsor, 1'2Mees. & W. 68. Involving vermin
and to the same general effect are, Vanderbilt v. Persse, 3 E. D. Smith (N.
Y.) 428 (bedbugs) ; Jacobs v. Morand, iio N. Y. Supp. 208 (waterbugs and
bedbugs) ; Fisher v. Lighthall, 4 Mackey (D. C.) 82 (ants). But where there
is a duty imposed on the landlord failure to fulfill it will justify abandonment under eviction. Bradley v. Goicouria, 67 How. Pr. 76. Where the defect is in existence at the time of letting the doctrine of caveat emptor applies. Roth v. Adams, I85 Mass. 341. As indicated in the decisions on this
subject' the defendant's proper remedy is preventive. A stipulation in the
lease covering the relations of the parties in event of the appearance of objectionable features is a matter but of a moment, provides adequate relief and
obviates the necessity of straining established legal doctrines in the apparent
interest of immediate justice.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-HOLDING OVER-TENANCY FROM YEAR TO YEARDATE OF COM-ENCEmENT-NOTICE TO QUiT.-By an agreement plaintiff let
premises to defendant from Nov. ii, i915 to Dec. 25, 1916 at yearly rent payable in quarterly installments. The defendant held over without any further
agreement so that by plaintiff's acceptance of the quarter's rent on March 25,
1917, defendant was recognized as tenant from year to year. On June 8, I9x7,
defendant gave notice that he would quit the premises on Dec. 25, 1917. Plaintiff contended that since the original erftry was on Nov. Ix,the tenancy could
be terminated only on Nov. ix of some year, and hence the notice on June 8
Held, that this
was ineffective because not six months prior to Nov. xi.
year to year tenancy was a new tenancy commencing Dec. 25, 1916 and determinable on any subsequent Christmas Day by giving six months notice.
Croft v. William F. Blay, Ltd. (i919), x Ch. 277.
When a tenant goes into possession and pays rent on a periodic basis under a void lease, no court has ever questioned the soundness of the plaintiff's
contention. It is settled law that the tenancy from year to year has inception
from the date of the original entry and can be terminated only upon the same
date of some succeeding year. Cf. Coudert v. Cohn, 118 N. Y. 309. And it
was also considered settled law in England (until the decision in the principal case) that when the tenancy from year to year was created by a holding
over by the tenant after the expiration of a valid lease the implied tenancy
could be terminated only upon the date of the original entry in some succeeding year. No distinction was made between the two situations. The rile in

question was thus stated in

2 SMITH'S LEADING CASES, 12th

edit., r23: "Where

a tenant holds over and becomes a yearly tenant, then, if the time of the
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vant or irrelevant. Henderson v. Broomhead, 4 Hurl. & N.,569. The main
point, therefore, upon which these cases turn is whether the alleged words
are pertinent or not. The instant case deals with this proposition, the Ohio
supreme court holding that this is but a distinction without a difference. Mr.
Justice Wanamaker, speaking for the Court, in a vigorous opinion referring
to Solomon and Shakespeare, as well as Magna Charta and the Constitution,
puts tie problem upon public policy. He cites no cases to support the conclukon arrived at; yet the argument that these statements do damage, whether relevant to the matter concerning which they are given or not, is founded
upon reason and common sense. Somewhat similar to the point here involved is that where the prosecution has been started before a magistrate
upon a false and malicious affidavit, in which case, quoting the Court, "the
rule is well settled in Ohio * * * that such perjured affidavit can be made the
basis of action in malicious prosecution." In the principal case the Court
of Appeals had said "There is no decision in Ohio directly on the question.
* * * In the cases outside our state, involving the question before us, and by
ihe text-writers, there is complete unanimity touching the doctrine that for
the.giving of evidence by a witness in a judicial proceeding, so long as such
tvidence is relevant to the matters concerning which it is given, an action
will not lie against the witness, even though the evidence be false, its falsity
known by the witness at the time, and that it be maliciously given."
PHYSICIANS AND SURGONs--NX0LIGZNT ADVICP--CAUSZ or AcrxoN.-Deferfdant, a physician, was employed by plaintiff to attend plaintiff's minor
child. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant, knowing the child's disease was
scarlet fever and contagious, negligently advised the plaintiff that it was safe
to visit the child; that the plaintiff, not knowing of the contagious nature
of the disease, relied upon the defendant's advice, visited the child and contracted scarlet fever to his damage. Defendant demurred. Held, that the
complaint states a cause bf action. Skillings v. Allen, (Minn., 99ig), 173
N. W. 663.
The liability of a physician to respond in damages to a patient who has
suffered injury from the physician's negligence is well settled. It is equally
well settled that no contractual relation need have existed between plaintiff
and defendant, for the liability attaches where the professional services were
rendered gratuitously. McNevins v. Lowe, 40 Ill. 2o9. A physician is not
comnielled to respond to the call of a charity patient, but if he undertakes to
attend said person, he assumes a duty to use reasonable care. Becker v. Janinski, i5 N. Y. Supp. 1675. "The material fact (to be) alleged in the petition
is that the relation of physician and patient existed between plaintiff and defendant at the time of the alleged negligence of the defendant." Hales v.
Raines, 146 Mo. App. 232. But it has also been held that a physician is liable
for injuries caused to one whom he was examining merely for the purpose
of giving information to a third person and not for the purpose of giving
treatment. Harviott v. Plimpton, i66 Miss. 585. In this case the relation
of the plaintiff to the defendant was quite remote, but in Eduards v. Lamb,
69 N. H. 599, the defendant was held liable where the relation of physician
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POSSE:SSION AND .RwI[T oF POSSESSION Or A GROWING CRop.-The plaintiff
owned apple trees growing eight feet from his boundary line. The branches
of these trees overhung the defendant's land. The defendant picked apples off
the overhanging branches and sold them. Plaintiff sued fcr damages for
conversion. Held, the defendant is guilty of conversion and liable to the
owner for the value of the apples. Mills v. Brooker (igx), "vK. B. 555.
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growth of the branches over the, defendant's land, but that this right
cannot be used as a basis for a right of appropriation of the prop-
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erty of the plaintiff, whether it be realty, personalty or the intermeciate type,
a growing crop. Furthermore, an action for conversion may rest either upon
possession or upon the right to possession, and the latter right was plainly
violated by the defendant when he took into his possession the property of
the plaintiff. .There is an interesting short note on this case in 25 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW, 210.
PRIZE JURISDICTION-CAPTURE ON INLAND

WArzTs.-DIuring the recent war

the British Government requisitioned, armed, and commissioned small trading
vessels on Lake Victoria Nyanza in East Africa. The Victoria. Nyanza is
an inland lake having no navigable connection with the ocean. All 'but the
smallest craft plying-upon it were transported overland, either whole or in
sections, and then assembled if necessary and launched. After being commissioned certaip of these vessels made captures of enemy craft and property. Held, that captures by commissioncd ships of His Majesty's Navy on
the waters of Lake Victoria Nyanza are the subjects of-jurisdiction in prize.
In the motter vof Certain Craft Captured on the Victoria Nyanza, L. R. E91],
x P. D. 83.
Whether jurisdiction in prize extends to inland .waters seems to have been
an unsettled question in the English law until the decision in the principal
case. During the recent war, Sir Samuel Evans is reported to have awarded
prize bounty to armed motor launches brought from England and launched
on Lake Tanganyika, also an inland lake (Lloyd's List, March Ig,1917), but
it appears that the question of prize -jurisdiction was not discussed. See L.
R. (igg) I P. D.83, 85. The question was discussed at length in the principal
case. The decision was founded upon the proposition (I) that all enemy property is prima facie liable to capture, except as the right of capture has been
limited by the Law of Nations, and (2) that captures by commissioned naval
forces on inland waters fall within none of the established limitations. The
decision is a logical inference from the nature and scope of prize jurisdiction.
See Lindo v. Rodney (1782), 2 Dbug. 613 (Lord Mansfield): Brown v. Unite4 States (x814), 8 Cr. i1o, 129, 137 (dissenting opinion" of Justice Story);
The Roumanian, L. R. (1915), P. D. 26, 37 (Sir Samuel Evans). "The prize
jurisdiction does not depend upon locality, but upon the subject matter." Per
Story, J., in Brown v. United States, 8 Cr. 11o, 139. In the United States,
admiralty jurisdiction in general extends to the Great Lakes and navigable
waters connecting them. The Propeller Genesee Chief et al. v. Fitzhugh
et al. (i851), 12 How. 443, 451; The Cotton Plant (x87o), 1o Wall; 577, 581
(semble); United States v. Rogers (1893), 150 U. S. 249, 252 (semble). The
admiralty courts exercised jurisdiction in prize over captures made on inland
waters duri'g the Civil War. Six Hundred and Eighty Pieces of Merchandise (863),--22 Fed. Cas. 252; United States V. Two Hundred and Sixty-Nine
and One-Half Bales of Cotton (i868), 28 Fed. Cas. 302 ( semble). This
seems also tai have been the Itilian and the Germi.n practice during the recent
war. See L. R. (1o19). I P. D. 83, 87. Capture would hardly fall within
prize jurisdiction unless naval forces at least participated. See The Rebeckah (1799), i C. Rob. 227; The Island of Trinidad (184), 5 'C.Rob. 92;
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Capture of Chinsurah (i8o9), Acton 179; Tlhrshavcn (x8og), Edw. Adm.
xo2; The Buenos Ayres (x81), 1 Dod. 28. It is also clear that the capture
should result from operations on the sea or on navigable inland water, or
at least from operations that are primarily naval in character. Compare cases
just cited and the case of Mrs. Alexandcr's Cotton (x864), 2 Wall. 404. Compare also the case of Six Hundred and Eighty Pieces of Merchandise, supra,
and United States v. Two Hundred and Sixty-Nine and One-Half Bales of
Cotton, supra.
STOCK DIVIDENDS-As INcOME OR C.PITAL-As BETWEEN LIFE TENANT AND
REMAINDERMA.-Mrs. D. by will created trusts in favor of her son and
grandson, her property consisting largely of corporate stock; after her death
several dividends were declared, payable in stock, part of which was declared
by the corporation to be paid out of a surplus accumulatedi before testatrix's
death, the remainder after. All these stock dividends were received by the
executor during administration. Held: That stock dividends paid out of earnings accumulated after the death of a stockholder are income, and go to the
life beneficiary of such trust; if paid out of earnings which accrued before the
life estate arose, they are principal, belonging to the corpus of the estate.
Declaration of directors of corporation as to the source of it6 dividends has
no binding or even persuasive effect on the court in deciding this question.
In re Duffil's Estate (Cal., i919). 183 Pac. 337.
It was found as a matter of fact in this case that the issuing of these stock
dividends did not reduce the value of the corpus of the estate, and that such
were actually paid out of earnings of the corporation. In this case the California court had to decide, apparently for the first time, between the two
rules existing on this subject, the one generally known as the "Massachusetts"
rule,-followed by Mass., Conn., Me., R. I., Ill., D. C., some English cases, and
one U. S Supreme Court case,-and the "Pennsylvania" or "American" rule,
followed by Ky., Tenn., Pa., N. Y., N. J., Minn., and probably other states.
It adopted, without apparent hesitation, the latter rule. By the former rule.
the "Massachusetts" rule, stock dividends, though declared after the death
of the testator, out of earnings accumulating after such death, nevertheless
become part of the corpus of the estate, and are not-to be considered as income. This seems to be based on the principle that such profit is treated as
an increase in the property of the corporation, and becomes part of the capital
thereof, and that the interest therein represented by each share of stock is
capital and not income. By the "Pennsylvania" rule, the one adopted in
the case at hand-stock dividends, declared after the life estate arose, and
paid out of earnings accrued thereafter, are income, going to the life beneficiary of a trust created by testator, as against the remainderman. A few
cases may be found to hold to this ruling even where the stock dividend was
paid out of earnings accruing before the life estate arose, if paid afterwards,
-but this class of cases is rather to be doubted on principle. The reason of
the rule adopted in the present case is that such a dividend is, in reality,
based on earnings, whether called by one name or another, and is, in fact,
the income of the capital invested; that it is rightfully and equitably the prop-
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erty of the life tenant, and the court here so decides. Accord: Earp's Appeal,
28 Pa. St. 368; Hite's Dezsee v. Hite's 9recutor, 93 Ky. 257; Pritchett v.
Nashville Trust Co., 96 Tenn. 472; also see i2 L. R. A. N. S. 768. Upholding
"Massachusetti" rule: Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. iox; Jackson v. Maddox
et a, Ann. Cas. 1912 B Wxz6;Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549. For an extended discussion of the question see z3 MicH. L; Rzv. 242.
TRESPASS-ANiMALS FZAP NATURAE-ATTRACTUD TO PRzMIsrs - DAMAGES
To ADJOININ PROPRTY-CAusE or AcrioN.-Defendants, bone manure manufacturers, had a heap of bones on their premises, near the plaintiff's farm, for
the purpose of their business. This caused a multitude of rats to assemble,
and these very easily found their way onto the. plaintiff's farm, resulting in
the destruction of the plaintiff's crops. He now seeks compensation for losses
thus sustained. It was not proved that the defendants' supply of bones was
more excessive than in the past thirty years, or excessively large. Held, no
cause of action had been established against the defendants. Steam v. Prentice Bros., Limited [ipi", i K. B. 394.
The court seems to have based its decision on the ground that the increase in the number of the rats in this year was not due to any acts or interference of the defendants, but merely to the fact that this was an eA-;tionally good breeding year. The plaintiff, though, tried to bring his case
under the broad doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher (1868), L. R. 3 H. L. 33onamely, that a landowner, who brings any agency onto his land which would
not naturally come there, is liable in damages to his neighbors who are injured by the subsequent escapes of said agency. The case failed on this
theory because it was not shown that the defendants brought the rats onto
their 1remises, nor that they did any act which artificially increased the number of them naturAlly present. See Brady v. Warren, [1900], 2 I. R. 632, 659.
If the damage was caused by some matural forces, and not by the acts of
the defendants, then the defendants can not be held liable. Giles v. Walker
(18W0), 24 Q. B. 656; Roberts et al v. Harrison, 1o Ga. 773. Tb&bring
this case under the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher it is not enough to
show merely that the rats came from the defendants' land; and the mere
fact that the defendants neglected to kill them. would probably not impose any liability.
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Assuming that the plaintiff could show that the presence of the
rats was a nuisance, and that it resulted naturally and proximately from the
acts of the defendants in storing these bones, it seems that the plaintiff might
have been more successful had he gone into equity for an injunction, as well
as for damages for past injuries. It is true that the defendants probably acquired a prescriptive right to carry on their business as they had for the
past thirty years; but is not true that they could maintain such a nuisance as
resulted in this year from the presence of the rats. It is entirely consistent
with the'facts, so far as revealed, that the defendants had no prescriptive right
to 'continue this nuisance, (i. e., the presence of the rats), even though they
had been in the same business for some thirty odd years. In order to establish such right the "use.must be adverse, under a.claim of right, and with the
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knowledge and acquiescence of the person whose right is invaded, and the
nuisance must be continued in substantially the same way and with equally
injurious results for the entire prescriptive period." 29 CYc. 12o6 and cases
cited. In the case in hand it appears that this was the first year that the
plaintiff had suffered such damage, and it seems therefore that the defendant
could have acquired no prescriptive right, because it was onlk' at this time
that the rats became a nuisance to the plaintiff. The burden of proof was
on the defendants to prove their prescriptive right, and they had not done so.
Stamm et al. v City of Albuquerque, 62 Pac. 973 ;Ball v. Ray, L. R. 8 Ch.
467. In the absence of such prescriptive right in the defendants equity would
most likely give the plaintiff equitable relief, as in Bellamy v. Wells (i8go),
63 L. T. R. 635; Rex v. Moore (1832), 3 B. and Ad. 184; Walker v. Brewster
(1887), L. R. 5 Eq. 25; Bland v. Yates (1914), 58 Sol. J.612; Richards v.
Daugherty, 133 Ala. 569.
UNFAIR

COMPtTITIoN--FZDZRAL

TRADE

COMnISSIoN -

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw.-A restraining order was issued by the Federal Trade Commission restraining the petitioner, a mail-order house doing an interstate business, from
certain unfair practices in connection with the sale of sugpr and other staple
commodities and restraining the sale of such articles below cost. In a petition to review the order, petitioner contends that the order was improvidently
issued because the petitioner had discontinued such methods, and that the
act creating the Commission was unconstitutional. Held, the order was warranted, but that it should be modified so as not to prohibit sales below cost.
Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C. C. A, 7th Circ.,
1919), 258 Fed. 3o7.

No inflexible rule can be laid down as to what conduct will amount to
unfair competition. Ludlow Valve Mfg Co. v. Pittsburg Mfg. Co., x66 Fed.
26, 92 C. C. A. 6o. Unfair competition is always a question of fact. Higgins
C. v. Higgins Soap Co., x44 N. Y. 462; Howe Scale Co. v. Wychoif, Seamans
and Benedict, x98 U. S. ii8. The court in the principal case said that petitioner's conduct in representing that it had obtained special price concessions
and could sell much cheaper than their competitors and that it purchased
selected brands from abroad, when in fact it had not so done, were means of
wrongfully imputing improper conduct to its competitors and consequently
was unfair competition. In view of the advertisements published by petitioner such construction seems justifiable. The fact that petitioner had discontinued such practice will have no influence unless the circumstances are
clear that the petitioner will not resume suh practices. -Goshen Mfg. Co. v.
Myers Mfg. Co., 242 U. S. 202, 37 Sup. Ct. io5, 61 L. Ed. 248. The Commission, it is true, has administrative and quasi-judicial functions. Orders
of the Commission are mandatory and have the force of judgments until reversed. The combinations of power so dissimilar, and each so far-reaching
creates a department which is unique in federal legislation. However grants
of similar authority to administrative officers and bodies have not, as the
court points out, been found repugnant to the constitution. Buttfield v. Stran4han, 192 U. S. 470, 24 Sup." C. 349, 48 L. Ed. 525; Union Bridge Co. v. United
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States, 204 U. S. 364, 27 Sup. Ct. 367, 51 L. Ed. 523; National Pole Co. v. Chicago and N. W. Ry. Co., 211 Fed. 65, 127 C. C. A. 56t. See also Field v.
Clark, 143 U. S. 649. The court in modifying the order of the Commission
gave little discussion to the matter. However an important question is presented. The right of a person to engage in a lawful business can not be
placed under the arbitrary and uncontrolled will of an individual or board.
Cicero Lumber Co. v. Town of Cicero, 176 11. 9, 42 L. R. A. 693. There is
no obligation upon a person to sell his commodities to the public equally and
no common law precedent for such can be found. Great Atlantic and Pacific
Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co. (19x5), 227 Fed. 46; Greater New York
Film Co. v. Biograph Co., 203 Fed. 39, 121 C. C. A. 375. See also 14 MIci.
L. RXv. 228. In 29 HARVAaD L. Rgv. 77, it is suggested that the common law
principle that intentional damage without justification is actionable might sustain such an obligation. This however seems untenable and might lead to a
return of the unsatisfactory system of government price fixing. 25 Yale L.
JouR. 194. The reason for a denial of the right of the courts to. enforce such
obligations seems to rest upon the constitutional guarantee in Article XIV
which protects all citizens of the United States against deprivation of property, "without due process of law."
WORKMEN'S COMrENSATIoN-ACcIDENT:

WHAT is ACcIDENTAL INJURY?-

A traveling salesman on a business trip missed the bus which was to carry
him to the train, his d lay being due to his stopping to talk to a customer.
He started to walk to che'station, carrying two sample cases and a suitcase.
He became excited through fear of losing the train, ran to the station and
as a result of the exertion ruptured a blood vessel in his brain, causing paralysis. Held, he had suffered an accident within the Workmen's Compensation Act. Crosby v. Thorp-Hawley Co., et al. (Mich., i919), 172 N. W. 535.
This decision is clearly within the rule established by decisions of the
British courts, notably in the opinion of Lord Macnaughton in Fenton v.
Thorley (19o3), A. C. 443, 19 Tittes L. R. 684, holding such cases
"accidental" on the broad ground of public policy. In fact the English cases
have, in general, gone far beyond the previously accepted idea that accident
and disease are mutually exclusive terms. In a recent case, Coyle v. Watson
(1915), A. C. x, the House of Lords held that a miner imprisoned in a shaft
where he caught cold, took a chill, and developed pneumnonia, had suffered an
"accident" within the "usual and ordinary meaning of the term." Although
Michigan decisions have not expressly adopted this doctrine and have not
expressly overruled, the case of Feder v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assoc.,
io7 Iowa 538, in which the court held that a man bursting a blood-vessel on
reaching io close a window, did not suffer an "accident" within the terms
of a general policy; yet some.doubt is cast on the authority of this case. In a
strong opinion in Sullitan v. Modern Brotherhood, 167 Mich. 524, 42 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 140, Justice Stone held that infection of an eye by gonococci due to
splashing of water while washing clothes is an accidental injury to tle eye
within the terms of the policy. The apparent tendency of recent decisions
is to broaden the meaning of the term "accident." See L. R. A. 1916 A 29,
267, 1917 D xo3. x918 F 867.

